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THE ROLE OF INFLUENCE IN THE ARC OF
TORT “REFORM”†
Georgene Vairo∗
To begin, I’d like to thank Rich Freer and the Pound Civil Justice Institute,
first, for bringing this distinguished group together, and second, for inviting me
to participate in this important symposium. Much of what I want to say has
already been said today. What I hope to do is to put my thoughts together in a
package that will be a bit interesting to you.
Obviously—and this has been said all day long—protecting citizens’ rights
to access to justice is essential to our democratic system of government. What I
want to do today is to share some thoughts with about how political, judicial,
and commercial influences have contributed to tort reform and related
developments. I begin with a slide with a picture, partly because I want to be
like Judith Resnik, and also because when I thought about what I wanted to
speak about, I recalled a TV commercial I saw around 1979 when I graduated
from law school. There was an empty playground in the commercial, with a
chain link fence around it, and no kids in sight. This ad was brought to us by
the insurance companies of America, and the paraphrased message was:
Greedy plaintiffs lawyers are bringing frivolous lawsuits, cities are being
forced to pay exorbitant settlements, leading to insurance premiums going up
and up and up, forcing cities to close the playgrounds.
Even though I was not an academic yet, I knew there was something wrong
with this picture and that the empty playgrounds probably had less to do with
greedy lawyers and more to do with corporate interests. My theme really is not
a novel one because Steve Daniels already talked about that this morning, and
many have written for decades now1 about how the public relations campaign
waged by commercial and political entities led to a narrative that turned the
† This Essay is based on remarks delivered at the Pound Civil Justice Institute/Emory University School
of Law Symposium held at Emory School of Law on October 15, 2015. It has been lightly edited for clarity
and updated with citations. Professor Vairo’s full remarks are available online. EmorySchoolofLaw, Tort
“Reform” and Its Impact on the Development of U.S. Law, YOUTUBE (Oct. 22, 2015), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=wVrZGICBEsA (beginning at 17:40).
∗ David P. Leonard Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, CA. The author is grateful for
and acknowledges the research and support provided by the staff and editors of the Emory Law Journal.
1 See John T. Nockleby, How to Manufacture a Crisis: Evaluating Empirical Claims Behind “Tort
Reform,” 86 OR. L. REV 533 (2007).
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public against the plaintiff’s bar, which in turn created a climate that provided
cover for state and local legislators, judges, and rule-makers, to enact laws and
rules that impede access to justice.
Of course, no talk about tort reform can begin without a quote from
Shakespeare’s Henry VI: “The first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers.”2
There has been a lot of debate about exactly what Shakespeare meant. Was he
referring to lawyers as mere parchment pushers who worked to the detriment
of the people? Or was he talking about lawyers as a bulwark against tyranny?
No matter what Shakespeare meant, I think we can probably agree that right
now the modern translation of this quote is “Let’s kill all the plaintiffs’ lawyers
until we need one.”
When we think about the evolution of tort reform, we see the seeds of that
evolution in the 1960s—there was a tremendous expansion of public and
private rights in the early 1960s and on into the 1970s. On the federal statutory
level, we saw the Equal Pay Act of 1963,3 Title VII,4 and the Voting Rights
Act of 1965,5 enacted. Regarding private rights, we saw Chief Justice Roger
Traynor of California writing a series of opinions that eventually led to strict
products liability law being recognized by courts around the country. We also
saw a very important procedural development in 1966: the amendment to Rule
23, which allowed for expanded use of damages class action suits.6
Rule 23(b)(3), together with the expansion of public and private rights, struck a
one–two punch against corporate America. Another important development
around this time was Bates v. Arizona, the 5–4 decision of the Supreme Court
which allowed lawyer advertising and provided the opportunity for more
entrepreneurial lawyering and the like.7 All of these developments led to the
tort reform reaction. Although the tort reform movement had been going on
since the 1950s, it really accelerated after these developments.
So why the tort reform war? The stock answers—mostly coming from Dan
Quayle and the Contract with America8—were that we have to cut costs for
2

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 2, sc. 2.
Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56.
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000a.
5 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
6 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
7 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
8 The Contract with America was a document signed by members of the United States Republican Party
in September 27, 1994, during a congressional election campaign. Contract with America, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/topic/Contract-with-America (last visited Mar. 11, 2016). The
Contract outlined legislation the Republicans promised would be enacted if they became the majority party in
3
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corporations and help them compete in the international arena. Equally
importantly, they argued that we needed to decrease insurance premiums and
protect the public. But there also seems to have been a political agenda
underlying all of this—the idea being that if we get the public against
plaintiffs’ lawyers, there may be less claiming and weaker results for plaintiffs
in the cases that were filed, which would eliminate plaintiffs’ lawyers as a
source for funding democrats. We also saw a move to fund campaigns to elect
tort-reform-oriented judges—especially at the state supreme court level—as
well as reformist legislators.9
How was this public relations war waged? Well, the Chamber of
Commerce and its network of interrelated friends piled on: the Citizens
Against Lawsuit Abuse (CALA), Law Litigation Abuse Watch, and so forth.
The important thing to understand is that these organizations were primarily
underwritten by not only large businesses but also by various conservative
political organizations, or conservatives such as the Koch brothers. Their
budget was humongous. Billions of dollars have been spent on this public
relations war with major companies around the country contributing at least a
million dollars to the cause per year.10
The public relations campaign was very effective at getting the press to
expand the narrative and delivering this narrative to the public. It may be no
surprise that the Wall Street Journal would be calling for tort reform, but other
mainstream press were using the same kinds of phrases: “jackpot justice,”
“runaway juries,” “the litigation explosion,” and so forth.11

Congress. Id. The Contract’s provisions included conservative stances on issues such as shrinking the size of
government, promoting lower taxes and greater entrepreneurial activity, and both tort reform and welfare
reform. Id.
9 Joanne Doroshow, The Secret Chamber of Commerce and Its “Tort Reform” Mission, HUFFINGTON
POST (Mar. 18, 2010, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joanne-doroshow/the-secret-chamber-ofcom_b_337634.html.
10 See Jim Vandehei, Business Lobby Recovers Its Clout By Dispensing Favors for Members, WALL ST.
J. (Sept. 11, 2001, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100015411979219346; David C. Johnson, The
Attack on Trial Lawyers and Tort Law, CTLA FORUM, Jan.–Mar. 2004, at 8, 9 (quoting a statement from the
former president of the American Association for Justice, who said, “It is no secret that, for more than three
decades, business interests have invested billions of dollars to sell the public a distorted view of a legal system
that is justifiably envied throughout the world. They say rampant litigiousness requires tort ‘reform’ that
restricts the legal rights of injured people, not those of businesses suing businesses, which account for most
litigation. What they seek, really, is corporate welfare-assurance that their misdeeds will be paid for not by
them, but by others”).
11 Nockleby, supra note 1, at 535; see also Paul H. Rubin, Opinion, Tort Reform Saves Lives, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 8, 2005, at A7.
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We even began to see a proliferation of websites—my favorite one:
lawyersstink.com. All of this led the tort reform movement to turn away from
the courts, which typically are responsible for administering the tort regime, to
legislators to rein in those courts. By 1986, there were forty-one states that
elected or enacted some form of tort reform.12 Just as one example, between
2000 and 2003, we saw nine states enact non-economic damages caps in
professional liability cases.13 By 2004, the number of non-economic-damages
states had risen to twenty-three.14 Other kinds of tort reform were also enacted,
including modifications to the joint and several liability rules, modifications of
the collateral source rules, and limits on punitive damages.
Now this was all fine and good for the tort reform movement except that
many state supreme courts were striking down state tort reform statutes as
unconstitutional. And, plaintiffs’ lawyers were filing lawsuits in courts
perceived to be pro-plaintiff. This led to the “Judicial Hellhole” survey.15
Starting in 2002, the Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for Legal Reform
(ILR) initiated the Judicial Hellhole survey by going around and asking
defense lawyers—typically lawyers who had actually lost a case in that
jurisdiction—“Well, what do you think that the worst judicial hell holes are?”
Madison County, Illinois? The Gulf States? West Virginia?” As a former New
Yorker, I’m proud to say that New York is the number one judicial hellhole
this year!
The “Hellhole” survey is obviously more fiction than fact. Professor Ted
Eisenberg wrote a very important article in 2009 that not only exposed all of
the flaws in the study but also talked about how ineffective tort reform was in
terms of its stated goals.16 And if we don’t believe how bad the Judicial
Hellholes report was from Professor Eisenberg, all we need to do is hear what
the spokesman for the ILR said about its own survey: “We have never claimed
to be an empirical study. . . . It’s not a batting average or a slugging

12 John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past and Future of Tort
Retrenchment, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1031 (2005).
13 DAVID C. JOHNSON, COMMONWEAL INST., THE ATTACK ON TRIAL LAWYERS AND TORT LAW 17
(2003), https://www.cttriallawyers.org/f/public/CommonwealReport2003.pdf (citing AM. OSTEOPATHIC ASS’N,
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY REFORM 2002–2003 ENACTED LEGISLATION (2003)).
14 Id.
15 Am. Tort Reform Found., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES, http://www.judicialhellholes.org/ (last visited Mar.
11, 2016).
16 See generally Theodore Eisenberg, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Liability Survey: Inaccurate, Unfair,
and Bad for Business, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 969 (2009).
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percentage. It’s no more or less subjective than what appears in The New York
Times.”17
In addition to these state tort reform efforts, we see the emergence of a shift
in the nature of tort reform, so to speak, to and through the procedural
backdoor: stealth tort reform. In some respects, this type of tort reform is easier
to enact than the substantive legislative or judicial reform that was adopted in
the states. Citizens might notice if their rights are taken away directly through
damages caps and the like, but perhaps the public will not notice as much when
changes are made to procedural rules.
This stealth procedural tort reform arguably had its genesis in 1976 at the
Pound Conference. To be clear, when I talk about the Pound Conference, I am
not talking about the Pound Civil Justice Institute, which is cosponsoring
today’s program. The Pound Conference is a series of national conferences.18
The one in 1976, at which Chief Justice Warren Burger spoke, focused on the
“causes of popular dissatisfaction with the administration of justice.”19 The
argument he made was that there was a loss of confidence in our judicial
system caused by lawyers—specifically plaintiffs’ lawyers—who were using
courts for their own ends rather than for obtaining justice.
Chief Justice Burger’s remedy for this loss of confidence was to streamline
procedure and enhance the use of ADR. At the time, some judges, lawyers, and
professors suggested that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were partially
the cause of some of the perceived problems. We had Justice Powell’s mere
“tinkering changes” quote, and even the Bernie Sanders of civil procedure
professors, Arthur Miller, writing an article in which he says that “[t]he liberal
and permissive Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . may be contributing” to
various problems.20

17 Adam Liptak, The Worst Courts for Businesses? It’s a Matter of Opinion, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/24/us/24bar.html.
18 About the GPC Series, GLOBAL POUND CONF., http://globalpoundconference.org/about-theseries/about-gpc#.VuNUN4wrLq0 (last visited Mar. 11, 2016).
19 1976 Pound Conference, GLOBAL POUND CONF., http://www.globalpoundconference.org/about-theseries/1976-pound-conference (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
20 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 523 (1980) (“I reiterate that I do
not dissent because the modest amendments recommended by the Judicial Conference are undesirable. I
simply believe that Congress’ acceptance of these tinkering changes will delay for years the adoption of
genuinely effective reforms. The process of change, as experience teaches, is tortuous and contentious.
Favorable congressional action on these amendments will create complacency and encourage inertia.
Meanwhile, the discovery Rules will continue to deny justice to those least able to bear the burdens of delay,
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This all led to pressure on the Federal Civil Rules Advisory Committee
(my apologies to Dean Klonoff, my panel-mate, who serves so ably on the
present Committee). This pressure, in turn, played a part in the adoption of a
series of amendments from the 1970s to the present. We should start by talking
a little bit about the discovery rules. The first significant set of amendments to
the discovery rules took place in 1977.21 But the amendments led Justice
Powell to lament that these were mere tinkering changes; that more had to be
done.22 Since 1977, we have had numerous amendments to the discovery rules,
all of which were designed to limit the scope and amount of discovery.
All of this may have been well-intentioned, but if you think about what
Professor Resnik said this morning, discovery is the FBI for poor people. The
problem is that discovery reform may have the inadvertent effect of being
more anti-plaintiff and pro-defendant, which poses a serious problem in the
administration of justice. And the 2015 discovery amendments, which went
into effect on December 1, have the plaintiff’s bar fearing a similar effect
because the courts are now required to really think about proportionality
factors—including the importance of the issues at stake in the action and the
amount in controversy—as aspects of whether discovery ought to be allowed
or not.
Probably the most famous aspects of tort reform deriving from the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were the 1983 Amendments to Rule 11 and Rule 16.
Addressing Rule 16 first, the amendments for the first time really pushed the
idea of federal judges as managers of the cases before them rather than
umpires, and that led to, for example, a push to settlement.23 Underlying the
amendment to Rule 16 is the idea that having a trial is an error—in fact, trials
are not a good idea because they are too costly. Rather, there should be
settlement, settlement, settlement.
Rule 11 is the other significant rule. At the time, the Advisory Committee
sought to use Rule 16 to get judges to shape up and Rule 11 to get lawyers to
shape up. Now, again, the intention was good. Rule 11 requires lawyers to do a
reasonable investigation into the law and the facts before they file a lawsuit
and not file for any improper purpose. Good idea. The problem is that 78.8%
escalating legal fees, and rising court costs.”); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix,
69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 8 (1984).
21 See generally Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery,
48 F.R.D. 487 (1970).
22 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 20, at 523.
23 Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 190 (1988).
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of Rule 11 motions were made by defendants against plaintiffs.24 That was my
finding from a review of the reported cases, and confirmed by other empirical
studies. This suggested that Rule 11 had become a tool for defendants to
bludgeon plaintiffs. This, in turn, gave rise to a chilling-effect problem. There
may have been meritorious cases not filed. In fact, some studies showed that
meritorious cases were not being brought because of the fear of sanctions
under Rule 11.25
As a result, in 1993 the Civil Rules Advisory Committee did the right
thing: they rolled back the amendments to Rule 11, making sanctions
non-mandatory and providing plaintiffs—or the targets of the Rule 11
motions—with the safe harbor. But the problem with that is it led to a
pushback in Congress where various lobbying efforts led to the enactment of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), in which, among other
things, Rule 11, for the purposes of securities cases, was rolled back to its 1983
glory. These actions continued despite the results of the Federal Judicial
Center’s 1995 study, which outlined judges’ experiences under the 1993
amendments—the more liberal amendments—and their general opinion that
frivolous litigation is not really a problem.26 To the extent that we have a
problem, the 1993 version of Rule 11 is sufficient to take care of any problems
that may arise.
I would argue that Rule 11 was not successful at all: it led to a decline in
civility. In fact, in one case, as a sanction where there were cross-motions for
sanctions, the judge required the lawyers to go out and eat lunch together so
they could start figuring out how to get along. Moreover, the Rule 11
experience led to a further erosion of public support for plaintiffs because of
the perception that so many cases are frivolous.
Let’s move to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court picked up the tort
reform ball quite capably, and I think there are a number of reasons for that. Of
course, during this period of time we saw the Supreme Court moving from
being quite liberal to being more and more conservative, which, as I will
describe later, led to more constricted readings of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Additionally, the Federal Judicial Center was basically instructing
judges to get rid of cases by settling them—don’t worry about adjudicating
24 Id. at 200; see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 11: An Update, 19 SETON HALL L. REV 511, 521 (1989).
25 Vairo, supra note 23, at 200.
26 See generally FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 1995 ANNUAL REPORT (1995).

VAIRO GALLEYSPROOFS2

1748

6/13/2016 1:17 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:1741

them; don’t worry about trials. Judges were taught to use Rule 16 to the
maximum.
During this period of time there were also a number of private seminars
sponsored by tort reform groups, at least sub silentio, where judges were
brought in and taught what the real law was. For example, there were all kinds
of seminars to teach federal judges about law and economics,27 and I wonder
whether it was a coincidence that one federal judge’s opinions on antitrust law
shifted 180 degrees over this period of time. There is that pendulum again,
swinging from the plaintiffs’ side to the defenses’ side.
Probably the first area in which the Supreme Court started to make an
impact from a stealth tort reform perspective was Rule 56: the summary
judgment rule. “No Spitting, No Summary Judgment” admonished a plaque
outside the courthouse of a district court judge in New Orleans.28 This judge
was so tired of being reversed for granting summary judgment that he refused
to grant them anymore. Thus, the bar for granting summary judgment was
very, very high. The perception, for all kinds of reasons, was that summary
judgment was going to be tough to get, and various Supreme Court and earlier
opinions backed up this perception.29
Then we get to the 1986 “Summary Judgment Trilogy.” The Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett case, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, was a virtual ode to
summary judgment.30 I actually agree with the bottom line of Celotex. If the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are about liberal notice pleading and liberal
discovery, but the plaintiff cannot come up with evidence to prove an essential
element of the case, well, then it is time to put up or shut up: summary
judgment should be granted. The problem was that in the other Trilogy cases—
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,31 for example—there was a lot of loose
language. The Court in Anderson repeated the well-known phrase that all
students remember: “On a motion for summary judgment, the court is not to

27 Id. at 8–11; Chris Young, Reity O’Brien & Andrea Fuller, Corporations, Pro-Business Nonprofits
Foot Bill for Judicial Seminar, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 27, 2014, 5:02 PM),
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/03/28/12368/corporations-pro-business-nonprofits-foot-bill-judicialseminars.
28 Steven Alan Childress, A New Era for Summary Judgments: Recent Shifts at the Supreme Court,
6 REV. LITIG. 263, 264 (1987).
29 Id. at 264–65.
30 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 327 (1986).
31 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
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resolve any issues of fact.”32 However, what the Court also said is that, “when
determining if a genuine factual issue as to actual malice exists in a libel suit
brought by a public figure, a trial judge must bear in mind the actual quantum
and quality of the proof necessary to support liability,”33 which sounds a little
bit like inviting judges to weigh the evidence.
The Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. case was also
important because of the way it discussed the plaintiffs’ expert in that antitrust
case.34 It laid the groundwork for the Daubert trilogy. In Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court admonished district court
judges to be gatekeepers when evaluating expert testimony.35 Everybody knew
that the Supreme Court was talking about trying to keep out junk science.
Did these decisions make a difference? Empirically, it is difficult to say.
But certainly in terms of the signaling function, they made a big difference.
The Second Circuit in Knight v. U.S. Fire Insurance Co., right after the Trilogy
came down, essentially said, “We were only kidding all those times when we
reversed grants of summary judgment. Really, please make summary judgment
motions.”36 The Fifth Circuit pre- and post-trilogy cases also made clear that
summary judgment should be granted more liberally; so now the courts are
saying that maybe you cannot spit anymore, but you can get summary
judgment. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also were turned on their head
by the Rule 8 pleading cases—Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly37 and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal38—where the emphasis went away from the “short plain statement”
language of the rule to plaintiffs having to “show” that they are entitled to
relief.

32

Id. at 248–49 (“[T]he issue of material fact required by Rule 56(c) to be present entitle a party to
proceed to trial is not required to be resolved conclusively in favor of the party asserting its existence . . . .”
(citing First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968))).
33 Id. at 254.
34 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (generally dismissing the plaintiff’s expert).
35 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
36 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986) (“It appears that in this circuit some litigants are reluctant to make full
use of the summary judgment process because of their perception that this court is unsympathetic to such
motions and frequently reverses grants of summary judgment. Whatever may have been the accuracy of this
view in years gone by, it is decidedly inaccurate at the present time, . . . . We hope that the Committee’s study
dispels the misperception so that litigants will not be deterred from making justifiable motions for summary
judgment.”).
37 550 U.S. 544, 554–56 (2007).
38 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
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Most of the empirical findings so far about the impact of Twombly and
Iqbal are that they are having an effect. There are more grants of motions to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6); however most of them are granted with leave to
re-plead.39 Thus, the jury is still out with respect to the impact of those cases.
However, as with the Rule 11 experience, most people suspect that fewer cases
that may have merit are being filed.
Next we have class action reform. Class actions are critical to vindicating
small claims cases. A combination of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes40 and
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend41 will make class actions basically disappear, along
with the ability to enforce the law where claimants have small value claims or
negative value claims. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion42 and the American
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant43 cases, which were discussed this
morning, are also very important. Most consumers are being forced to sign
arbitration agreements that waive class arbitration. If class actions and
arbitration are dead, we have a real problem. As Judge Posner has said, only an
idiot would sue for $30.44
Congress has also stepped into the fray. I mentioned the PSLRA earlier.
There also is the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,45 which provides
defendants with a very important forum-shopping tool. Defendants had been
complaining that they were being sued in nationwide class actions in state
(judicial hellhole) courts, which very freely granted class certification. The
enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act made it easier for defendants to get
a free pass out of state courts and into federal courts.
There also are various other statutes where the federal government has
restricted the remedies available to plaintiffs, and the states are still in the act.

39

JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., UPDATE ON RESOLUTION OF RULE 12(B)(6) MOTIONS
GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 4 & nn.8–9, 5 (2011) (As of 2011—the Federal Judicial Center found that
there was increased rate of grant in financial instruments cases, but not in others, after Iqbal motion grant with
leave to re-plead. However, “the opportunity to present an amended complaint reduced the overall rate at
which movants prevail (from 65.9% to 56.4% in 2006, and from 75% to 62.9% in 2010), and reduced the size
of the movant’s advantage in 2010 (from 9.1% in the March 2011 study to 6.3% in this study). While this
overall difference of 6.3% meets conventional levels of statistical significance, this difference is the result of
the sizeable effect of the financial instruments cases.”).
40 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
41 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
42 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
43 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
44 Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
45 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2012).
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My adopted state, California, was actually the first to enact a cap in medical
malpractice cases.46 Last year, there was an initiative to overturn the cap. TV
ads in support of the initiative were aimed at plaintiffs’ lawyers. Ultimately,
the initiative to overturn the caps failed.47 In West Virginia, the state enacted
four tort reform statutes just last year, in one legislative session.48 The West
Virginia Chamber of Commerce president essentially said, “We have only just
begun.” In 2015, thirteen states were still considering tort reform.49
So, did tort reform work? There is no question that claiming is down
nationally. In Texas, for example, a 2015 study showed that civil lawsuits are
down 17% over the last ten years.50 A RAND Corporation study looked at
malpractice claiming and the original hypothesis, prior to the study, was that
there was over-claiming. The RAND study, however, showed that there was
under-claiming. Overall, the statistics showed that only 10% of injured people
actually seek compensation by writing to their insurance companies, and only
2% actually file a lawsuit.51
In fact, there is a doubling down effect of the tort reform effort. Even in
states that have not enacted tort reform, the public relations campaigns have
led to a diminution in claiming.52 Tort reform efforts have had a tremendous
influence on jurors. Even though plaintiffs prevail in 48% of the cases in which
there is a jury trial, most of the big verdicts are in business-to-business cases.53
In addition, the median jury award is less than judge-awarded
compensatory awards. The median award by a jury is $27,000; the median

46 See Provisions of MICRA, CAPP: CALIFORNIANS ALLIED FOR PATIENT PROT., http://micra.org/
specifics-of-micra/provisions-of-micra/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2016).
47 See Melanie Mason, Proposition 46, on Medical Malpractice Awards, Fails, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 4,
2014, 9:24 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-prop-46-results-20141104-story.html.
48 See Martin & Seibert, L.C., West Virginia Passes Significant Tort Reform Measures, UPDATE ON L.,
Apr. 2015, at 1, 1.
49 See AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2015–2016, at 5–42 (2015), http://www.judicial
hellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/JudicialHellholes-2015.pdf.
50 Angela Morris, Why Are Filings Falling? Civil Lawsuits Down 17 Percent in 10 Years, LAW.COM
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award by a judge is $75,000.54 The public relations campaigns have been
successful in shaping juror ideas. For instance, “83% of jurors think that there
are ‘far too many frivolous lawsuits,’ [while] 57% believe that ‘lawsuits
interfere with the development of [safe] and useful products,’ and 51% believe
that ‘big business . . . is adequately concerned with safety [issues].’”55
The argument that there has been a litigation explosion has been shown to
be a fiction by Professor Galanter and other scholars.56 More importantly, tort
reform has not achieved many of its stated purposes. For example, one purpose
of tort reform was to drive down the cost of insurance. It probably has not done
that. The studies are mixed and the Congressional Budget Office cannot figure
it out.57 But, to the extent that there has been any impact, it has been marginal.
It also hasn’t changed the practices of professionals. A study that was
conducted last year that focused on emergency care showed that the intensity
of practice—what doctors were doing in the emergency room—did not change
whether they were in a tort reform state or a non-tort reform state.58
Where are we today? This slide shows another picture. This playground has
people in it. This is certainly where we want to be. We want to be in a society
where we have playgrounds open, and where we have safer products. And so
the question is this: What are we going to do about it? I emailed Katherine
Flynn Peterson—a past president of the American Association of Justice—as I
was preparing for today, and I asked, “What should we be doing and how are
we going to combat the billions of dollars that the Chamber of Commerce and
its friends are putting into their public relations war?” This is a hard question.
Many of the plaintiff-oriented groups are dependent on individual membership
fees, which will not in a million years stack up to the billions that the Chamber
receives every year. Additionally, lobbying is difficult: in one year, the
American Association of Justice had three lobbyists compared to eighty just
for the Chamber of Commerce.
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Id.
56 See Nockleby, supra note 1, at 544.
57 See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM: EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES
(2004), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/55xx/doc5549/report.pdf.
58 Daniel A. Waxman et al., The Effect of Malpractice Reform on Emergency Department Care, 371 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1518 (2014).
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So what other counterattacks can we engage in? Well, we have Ralph
Nader, whose American Museum of Tort Law was recently opened;59 maybe
that will help spread the word. There is something else that works: lawyers
taking it into their own hands. The Los Angeles County plaintiffs’ lawyers, for
example, always ask potential jurors about whether they have heard about the
hot coffee case. Of course they all have. Paraphrasing Arthur Miller, that case
is the cosmic anecdote which purportedly shows rampant frivolous litigation
and runaway juries. The plaintiffs’ lawyers then talk to the jury about the case.
In voir dire, they try to tease out whether the potential jurors know how serious
the injuries to that plaintiff were and that the amount of damages that she was
awarded were cut down significantly on appeal.
Obviously, the plaintiffs’ bar has to step it up and become more generous
in terms of funding their organizations to get the alternative message out. I
don’t know whether social media is going to be useful in this effort or not. But
if we do not, we’re going to be back to products being “unsafe at any speed.”
So, I hope that Professor Freer is correct that people will notice that the
courtroom door is closing,60 so that we can ensure products that are safe at any
speed. Thank you.

59 Jenny B. Davis, A Dream Come True: Ralph Nader Open His American Museum of Tort Law, ABA J.
(Oct. 1, 2015, 8:40 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a_dream_come_true.
60 Richard D. Freer, Exodus from and Transformation of American Civil Litigation, 65 EMORY L.J. 1491
(2016).

